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FROM INTRAORGANIZATIONAL STRUGGLE TO 
CO-OPERATION BETWEEN ORGANISATIONAL 
PROFESSIONS.
AN ETHNOGRAPHIC STUDY OF A FRENCH 
BASED INDUSTRIAL COMPANY






Alors que la plupart des études illustrent une 
montée en puissance de la fonction financière, peu 
d’attention a été accordée à une coexistence 
possible entre plusieurs rationalités. En étudiant les 
pratiques de contrôle de gestion observées lors 
d’une enquête ethnographique, nous montrons 
comment la confrontation entre groupes divergents 
laisse parfois la place à des formes de négociation 
et de coopération. Plus que le pouvoir ou la 
domination, les groupes essayent parfois 
simplement de vivre ensemble.
ABSTRACT
Little attention has been given to the coexistence 
that could exist between several rationales. Most 
studies illustrate the victory of the financial 
rationale, other groups trying in vain to resist 
change.  In this paper, based on an ethnographic 
study of management control practices, we try to 
show how two groups oppose each other, following 
divergent rationales. More than power or 
domination, however, they seek to find a way to live 
with each other. Struggles and conflicts translate 
into negotiation and co-operation. 2
1. INTRODUCTION
Comparing English and German companies, Armstrong (1985) showed that financial 
management was not the only possibility. The accession to key positions in an organisation 
actually depends on a struggle between professional groups (Fligstein, 1987). Notably, this 
struggle oppose financial officers to engineers (e.g. Armstrong, 1985; Dent, 1991; Vaivio, 
1999; Briers & Chua 2001) or to marketing and sales officers (e.g. Fligstein, 1987; Ezzamel 
& Burns, 2005). Financial officers may also be described as managers trying to influence and 
control workers (see Ezzamel, Willmott & Worthington, 2004) or established professional 
groups (see Ezzamel, 1994; Oakes, Townley & Cooper, 1998; Kurunmäki, 1999; Townley, 
2002). However, most studies illustrate the victory of the financial rationale, other 
professional groups trying in vain to resist change (Fligstein, 1987; Dent, 1991; Ezzamel, 
Willmott & Worthington, 2004; Ezzamel & Burns, 2005). The financial domination then 
often seems to be considered as inevitable (even if exceptions do exist, e.g. Jazayeri & 
Hopper, 1999). 
This struggle between professions leads to a renegotiation of the balance of powers, but 
also to a redefinition of values and objectives associated by workers to their practice. More 
than a power struggle, it can be seen as a struggle to claim and maintain an occupational 
identity (Covaleski, Dirsmith, Heian & Samuel, 1998; Oakes, Townley & Cooper, 1998; 
Townley, 2002; Ezzamel, Willmott & Worthington, 2004; Ezzamel & Burns, 2005). The 
confrontation between divergent logics and rationales creates a conflict resolved by the 
domination of one group over the others. Only this resolution allows to maintain a unique 
value set, essential to the construction of an organisational identity (Townley, 2002). 
The struggle between professional groups may last, however. Most researchers study 
the loss or gain of legitimacy, adopting one group’s point of view when the result is already 
known. This let them show the encounter of divergent rationales as a linear and inevitable 
change process, from one identifiable and unique status to another (Quattrone & Hopper, 
2001). Little attention has been given to the coexistence that could exist, for a more or less 
long period of time, between two rationales. It may be valuable to position ourselves at the 
very moment when the result is not already known, in order to understand the logics at stake 
and the tactics followed by each individual to orientate others in a specific direction. More 
important, it becomes possible to see the coexistence between rationales and its daily 
consequences. Finally, this posture allows us to understand how occupational identities are 
constructed, avoiding to take them for granted. 
These studies also concentrate on individuals subjected to change in their environment. 
A starting point is described as relatively balanced. Then a specific phenomenon modifies 
forces at stake, and the organisation begins to change. In particular, disturbance may come 
from headquarters (e.g. Dent, 1991), from a new shareholder (e.g. Ezzamel, Willmott & 
Worthington, 2004) or from a shift in a political agenda (e.g. Covaleski & Dirsmith, 1988; 
Oakes, Townley & Cooper, 1998). Relying on their hierarchical position, these remote actors 
try to impose their power, to which dominated populations may resist, or not. 
However, it may be useful to assume that all groups and individuals have their own 
plans. These may be convergent, creating co-operation, or divergent, implying conflict or 
avoidance (Simmel, 1955). Each group will thus support a project using specific tactics. 3
When a project matches the current organisational evolution, its supportive group feels 
proactive and sees change as a progress. On the contrary, an individual that does not like what 
he or she sees as a new trend would feel subjected to change. And yet every group or 
individual may try to intervene directly in the direction taken by the organisation or position 
itself as an observer. When there exists a dominant rationale, a challenger group may appear 
and propose a competing project (Fligstein, 2001), an alternative logic of action (Vaivio, 
1999). 
One group or individual carrying out a plan may want to impose a vision of what is 
appropriate behaviour (Becker, 1963; Fligstein, 1987). This entrepreneur may not be in a 
dominant position, and thus needs to cooperate with others and engage them in a collective 
action, using social skill and specific tactics (Fligstein, 2001). More precisely, any 
entrepreneur needs to enrol allies, to mobilise a network to display strong arguments and 
build unavoidable positions (Latour, 1987, 1991; Robson, 1991). But to achieve domination 
or gain power is not always a purpose: sometimes the challenger group only tries to survive in 
the  organisation. Individuals need to live with each other, and organisational professions 
begin to cooperate. 
We seek to illustrate this through an analysis of management control practices that we 
observed during an ethnographic study of a French industrial firm. One of the authors 
conducted a 4-month-long ethnographic study at TechCo, a multinational aeronautic 
company. Being immersed into the field was a means to hearing discourses and seeing 
practices, uncovering competing projects and their related rationales. At TechCo, we will 
show, two rationales – financial and technical – confront each other. However, one of the 
interesting aspects of the case is the extent to which the competing actors lay claim to a 
shared overarching objective – improving the company’s performance – but have conflicting 
positions and legitimizing discourses around what that should mean. They support competing 
“styles of accountability” (Ahrens, 1996). As a result, there is a struggle over control, which 
is a struggle over identity (Roberts, 1991), that has not yet led to a final and definitive victory 
of one side over the other. This does not mean that it will go on this way indefinitely: it means 
that we don’t know what and when the end will be. It is this very process of competition 
between two logics and trajectories that is our focus here and not the final outcome. 
At TechCo, the technical rationale is dominant and devoted to the magnificent past of 
the company. It serves an historical and deep rooted cultural tradition of technical excellence. 
But the financial rationale is linked with the contemporary and cosmopolitan ideal of 
globalisation. Financial officers thus appear as a challenger group. As “local outsiders trying 
to redefine the game in order to enter it”, they follow a trickle-up trajectory (Djelic & Quack, 
2003, p. 314). When they try to gain support for their vision, they carry with them – perhaps 
unconsciously – the ideal of globalisation. As Dent (1991) and Ahrens (1997) have shown, it 
is through interaction and discussion that accountants may implicate accounting in 
organisational action. But Ezzamel & Burns (2005) showed that non accountants may fear a 
form of encroachment, and believe that change would allow accountants to carry out their 
own tasks, or even to take out their position in the organisation. According to the authors, a 
means of getting accepted is then to handle some low-grade job (Ezzamel & Burns, 2005). 
Financial officers thus have to be able to “cultivate” a relationship with heterogeneous 
audiences, in order to limit the “contextual power asymmetry” that may exist between them 
(Bigus, 1972). Conflict turns into negotiation and co-operation. 4
Another tactic consists in setting up management tools. Indeed, the design of a tool may 
contain and hide theories (Beunza & Stark, 2004), when its use implies some pedagogy 
instilling an invisible power (Oakes, Townley & Cooper, 1998). The translation of ideas into 
inscriptions hides concepts into numbers (Robson, 1992), rendering the project invisible. 
According to Briers & Chua (2001), it is the possession of a boundary object that is most 
effective when one wants to become an obligatory passage point (Callon, 1986; Latour, 
1987). It is thus important to study electronically mediated interactions (Knorr Cetina & 
Bruegger, 2002; Beunza & Stark, 2004).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Firstly, we will expose our research 
methods and a brief description of the company. We will then try to identify ideals and 
rationales shaping TechCo’s culture. Thirdly, we will describe the forms of confrontation 
between rationales, showing how several individuals attempt to redefine the styles of 
accountability in their company. This narrative will allow us to show how conflict translates 
into negotiation and co-operation. Finally, a conclusion will be drawn.
2. FIELD STUDY
TechCo is a French industrial firm in the aeronautic sector, medium-sized (a little under 
one thousand staff) and a subsidiary of a diversified international group (more than ten 
thousand employees, with sales of 1.8 billion euros in 2005). Its structure is divided into three 
divisions, each corresponding to a type of products (Division X manufactures fuel circulation 
systems; Y specialises in oxygen masks; and Z produces components for aircraft control 
panels). The divisions are themselves divided into three departments: production (sometimes 
including a purchasing management and a logistics management), industrialisation (design 
office and works methods), and design (Research and Development). Two divisions are 
located in the Greater Paris area, on the same site as the Headquarters, and the third (Division 
X) is based in South-east France (Fig.1). 
Fig.1. TechCo organisation chart
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Our field work is based on an ethnographic approach (Van Maanen, 1979 ; Sanday, 
1979). Notably, it is based on the enquirer being present in the workplace of those under 
observation for a prolonged period of time. The main method associated with ethnography is 
the direct observation of practices. In the event, it was participant observation, and therefore 
understanding through practising, which was employed (see Becker, 1958). Since the goal 
was to better understand the viewpoints expressed by different actors, being fully immersed in 
daily routines and concrete work situations was a necessity (Dent, 1990; Covaleski & 
Dirsmith, 1990). 
After carrying out several interviews with members of the holding company and other 
divisions of the same group, one of the authors was recruited by the vice Chief Financial 
Officer (vice-CFO) of TechCo. For a period of four months, the official mission was to help 
in the implementation of an Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) software
1. In particular, the 
observer was to focus on “purchasing flows” and on the company’s “reporting flows”. With 
respect to the first, the goal was in fact to translate into the form of “workflows” the set of 
tasks performed in the Purchasing Management, but also to ensure that all information 
regarding the suppliers would be input correctly into the new programme. For the reporting 
flow, the goal was to prepare specifications for the tailoring of reports, enabling management 
controllers to continue to produce the “reporting book” on a regular basis. 
This project therefore gave the observer the opportunity to meet all the members of the 
Financial Management (within which the observer’s office was located), several members of 
the Information Systems Management (all those working on the project), as well as numerous 
operational managers (notably members of the Purchasing Management). The position of the 
observer, integrated into the Financial Department but distanced from issues of career and 
influence by its status, enabled to build close ties with the management controllers. However,
the standards of the new information system did not perfectly map onto the organisation in 
place: it was therefore necessary to choose, for each task, between modifying the organisation 
and making specific IT developments. As a result, the observer had an opportunity to see 
operational managers “deconstruct” and “rationalise” their own ways of working. 
Furthermore, as a “young graduate” with little experience and much to learn, allowed the 
observer to ask a certain number of questions, and to force every interlocutors to explain 
explicitly practices which they consider self explanatory. Finally, the participant observer 
status enables someone to focus attention on the range of non-human elements that play a role 
in the organisation (Callon, 1986; Latour, 1987, 1991): for instance, the premises (layout of 
buildings and offices), documents (in-house newspapers, spreadsheets provided or received 
by management controllers, digitised data files), or IT interfaces (which impose a particular 
configuration how information is processed and how it is displayed) may influence the form 
that the practice of management control will take (Ahrens & Chapman, 2007). 
Using an ethnographic approach enables us to see contradictory rationales and divergent 
viewpoints appear (Ahrens & Dent, 1998). Although the discourses of controllers sketch a 
certain vision of the organisation, it is not necessarily congruent with the vision given by 
operational managers. Hence, the goal is to bring out this divergence and bring to light the 
similarities and differences between the two points of view. All definitions of the situation are 
therefore considered as valid as that given by the financial managers. 
   
1 In fact, the project, supervised by the vice-CFO and the Chief Information Officer (CIO), consists in 
harmonising the information systems of all the subsidiaries in the division and to set up the accounting module 
of the software used in production.6
In the beginning, the observer’s sole goal was to better understand the daily work 
routine of management controllers. The approach was therefore mainly inductive (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967). The posture adopted thus bore the mark of interpretive sociology: it was a 
matter of understanding the meaning that actors give to their actions (Weber, 1971), and 
building a subjective definition of the work done by actors in their daily interactions (Hughes, 
1996; Goffman, 1961; Becker, 1963). This position justifies the choice of taking a qualitative 
approach aimed at “in-depth” understanding of practices, and observing control practices in 
situ (Ferreira & Merchant, 1992; Tomkins & Groves, 1983). Within the bounds of reason, the 
observer tried to tie what people did with what they said (Van Maanen, 1979), and compare 
(and occasionally even confront) the discourses of various people to strengthen the credibility 
of each piece of information. 
The data gathered consist of a systematic description of the premises, situations and 
practices being observed, and a transcription of formal discussions (during meetings) and 
informal conversations (in the corridors, in front of the coffee machine, during lunchtime) that 
the observer was a party to. With this purpose, a field journal was kept and updated daily. For 
instance, during each meeting, the room (its size, furniture, decor, any office equipment), the 
people (those present, their dress code, positions around the table, those invited but absent), 
and the discourses (order of speaking, contents of discourse, the tone of voice adopted, not 
forgetting jokes and small talk) were systematically described (which posed no problem, 
given that generally everyone took notes and the observer was in fact in charge of writing up 
the minutes). Likewise, after each meal, comments about the people present at the table and 
what could be remembered of the discussions were noted by the observer. After the 
observation period, telephone conversions and several revisits to the field of research enabled 
us to obtain complementary data. 
3. IDEALS AND RATIONALES: TRADITION VS. EMERGENT
At TechCo, it is the “Design Office”, i.e. the research activities, which is the pride and 
joy of the company. Indeed, the firm sells high-technology products in limited series 
production runs: research is therefore considered critical to the company’s future. It is also a 
way of displaying the particularly high-level expertise of the engineers and technicians 
concerned: leaving production to move into design is seen as a move up in status. Both 
division directors followed the same career path: They moved from positions as directors of 
production towards responsibilities as directors of design before being promoted as directors 
of their respective divisions. It is the technical trades calling upon the competencies of 
engineers, which are most highly valued in the company. 
However, there are some at TechCo who do not enjoy this situation. Indeed, celebrating 
the technical expertise of the company has amounted to pushing financial considerations into 
second place. The CFO, the vice-CFO, and the management controllers therefore consider 
that finance should have a more important position in operational decision-making. The CFO 
supervises the director of accounting (who manages a team of twelve, including a chief 
accountant), the management control manager (who manages a team of three management 
controllers and two management assistants), and the vice-CFO. Each management controller 
is attached to a division: they are therefore close to operational managers and take part in the 
board meetings of their divisions (every two months). This closeness reminds them on a daily 7
basis of the symbolic devaluation of finance in the company, yet still allows them to see, from 
a financial definition of the business, what may pass as mistakes or weaknesses by operational 
managers. They then refute a situation that they see as inadequate: They resent their work 
being perceived as interfering in the work of operational managers. 
During an informal conversation, for instance, one of the management controllers 
complained about the lack of financial follow-up in projects: 
(Paul, management controller at Z. Company canteen): For the A380, we had to make two 
calculators. But the costs went sky-high… so now they are selling at a loss! Well, commercially, 
we had to be in on it… but still! (…) The division directors don’t do enough financial plans, and 
the studies are not at all accessible to the finance. They hide them and keep everything for 
themselves. So there are no figures before negotiations. [In my former company], there were 
always financial simulations, and a sales rep could not sell a project until it had been validated by 
a financial officer. Here, it’s really not like that…
Management controllers (and more generally, representatives of the Financial 
Management) feel constrained by operational managers in their own work. They come to 
perceive a certain number of problems, but they cannot react because they are sidelined from 
the decision-making process. In particular, their position within the organisation does not 
allow them to constrain operational managers. On the contrary, any claims they make must 
take into account the operational viewpoint if it is to get through. 
Having experienced different situations in their former companies, controllers have 
difficulty accepting this weakened position. They describe themselves as simple observers, 
not able to actively participate in decision-making: They see everything, but can say nothing. 
Their influence passes instead through the management tools that they bring to life on a daily 
basis (monthly reporting, budgetary procedure), or one-off tools (often Excel spreadsheets) 
that they create on demand from the division directors. Most often, their tools are no more 
accepted than their participation in decision-making. But when they link organisational action 
to accounting they provide an opportunity for interaction. 
Following Ahrens (1996), we could say that two “styles of accountability” – technical 
and financial – oppose each other. These styles are related to divergent rationales and ideals. 
Technical ideals at TechCo are deeply embedded in its history and culture. The company 
maintains its historical core by narratives and stories that circulate among employees, thus 
becoming mythical. Its website includes a significant historical section that celebrates the 
glorious past of TechCo: 
“In 1879, a Frenchman made a maiden balloon flight that changed the course of his life forever. 
His name was Maurice M., and in 1896 he founded the company that later became TechCo. M. 
struck up a friendship with one of the century's great balloonists, J Paul. Together, they set up a 
ballooning society named the Union Aeronautique de France.”
“Keen to establish his firm's presence in all areas of the conquest of the skies, M. changed its name 
in 1909 to Societe Francaise de Ballons Dirigeables et d'Aviation TechCo, incorporating the trade 
name into the company name for the first time. The workshops, in turn, were taken over and 
renamed TechCo. The year 1911 marked the end of a transition. The enterprise was no longer a 
craft venture producing to order. It was now an industrial company manufacturing in large runs 
and bidding for procurement contracts.”
TechCo website consulted on December 8, 2005 (extracts).
Thus, the original source of TechCo culture lies in technical expertise and excellence 
and moreover, in the enthusiastic spirit of its founders. Technical superiority is therefore 
intimately associated with eagerness and fervour, very positive values. 8
Financial ideals lie on discourses that have a different status. Even if they appear on 
TechCo’s website, they don’t belong to the rich story of the company. Indeed, in the 
“Strategy” section, financial ideals appear as an insignificant issue vis-à-vis the actual key 
factors of success: high technology, R&D, manufacturing processes and methods.
“The TechCo strategy is powerfully oriented toward world growth in high-tech sectors to satisfy a 
demanding customer base; growth in expanding, high-margin markets to secure our long-term 
future; growth in niches where TechCo can hold leadership positions; steady growth in earnings 
per share to ensure shareholder satisfaction and loyalty.”
“Mastering the most advanced technologies: One of the keys to TechCo's success is its continuous 
presence on the leading edge of innovation and technology. This enables us to offer products that 
are efficient, safe, and compliant with the strictest standards and certification requirements. Our 
efficiency-embodied in numerous patents-is the result of R&D programs focusing on factory 
performance and manufacturing processes. The programs cover such areas as CAD, CAPM, 
robotics, and optimization of structural design.”
TechCo website consulted on December 8, 2005 (extracts).
The unobtrusiveness of financial discourses, in comparison with the current average on 
most corporate websites, shows that the technical rationale is local and ingrained in history 
and myths, whereas the financial rationale lies on cosmopolitan actors (Briers & Chua, 2001) 
and outer discourses linked with globalisation and “financialisation” (Djelic & Quack, 2003). 
While technical managers’ careers stretch out within TechCo just after they graduate, new 
financial managers have been recruited outside the company in order to renew the financial 
team. 
This situation leads us to say that the “dominant corporate culture” is an engineering 
culture, close to that observed by Dent (1991) in a railroad company: “Prior to the study, the 
dominant culture within this management group was well established, and centred on 
engineering and production concerns. Accounting was incidental in this culture: it was 
necessary in the technical-rational sense of ensuring that revenues were accounted for and 
suppliers were paid, but it was not incorporated into the culture among the senior 
management elite in any significant way. Rituals, symbols and language celebrated the 
primacy of the engineering and production orientation” (p.707). Within this culture, engineers 
are judged as more competent to assess work and therefore create management tools. 
Controllers must not interfere in projects: it is the operational managers who design them and 
sell them to clients, with the financial relevance remaining a secondary consideration. This 
engineering culture support a technical style of accountability (Ahrens, 1996): The division 
manager is held accountable for technical excellence of the products, more than for 
profitability and margins. 
Within the “financial subculture” (Dent, 1991), reality is perceived differently. 
According to financial officers, the current state of mind was valid when TechCo was a very 
profitable small-sized firm, but the environment has changed. They state three main 
arguments to justify their participation in decision-making: the holding expects results in 
financial terms; clients want to cut costs; the risks of failures are high – notably for projects. 
Financial officers thus support a competing rationale, and ask for a more financial style of 
accountability in order to challenge the technical culture. 
The technical dominant culture appears through symbolic and material inscriptions. One 
of the most visible symbols resides in the allocation of buildings. The main site actually 
contains two addresses, each having a distinct parking lot and reception area. The first address 
is composed of several one-storey buildings and it houses the senior management, human 9
resources, general services, the production and research workshops of the two divisions, 
quality management, as well as the works council and the company canteen. The second, 
more recent, address is a two-storey building that houses the sales management, financial 
management, and information systems management. It is possible to move from one address 
to the other without leaving the building by taking an underground passageway. This second 
building was built as a response to a problem of space, but being transferred from the old 
building to the new was seen more as a demotion than as providing more space for the 
services concerned. A symbolic separation can therefore be observed between the main, more 
prestigious, activities and the support activities that are isolated, distanced, and hidden away. 
Likewise, rituals and symbols bear witness to the pride of belonging to a cutting-edge 
industry. Air shows or induction days for new employees become an opportunity to show and 
explain the products designed by TechCo. Also heralding this sense of pride are large posters 
displayed in numerous rooms, or mechanical parts exhibited in showcases. TechCo’s 
technical culture is so embedded that certain members of the financial management did not 
hesitate to mobilise it when they celebrated the first steps of the A380, a giant airliner 
designed by Airbus in which TechCo is participating, or by perpetuating the “myth” of the 
company’s founder, who would land his helicopter in front of his office (which he flew 
himself). 
But the financial officers also deploy their own inscriptions. The CFO, who declares 
himself far more interested in problems of acquisitions and mergers than in operational 
management, explicitly hopes to introduce a more financial culture into the company. After 
graduating with an MBA from the University of Columbia, he worked in the M&A 
department of a large French industrial group. Management controllers are also “defectors”. 
Before joining TechCo, one of the management controllers worked in an auditing firm owned 
by one of the Big Four. The other two were headhunted by the CFO from a company reputed 
for the efficiency of its management control system (Lambert, 2005). Showcasing externally 
acquired competencies in the divisions and departments reputed for their professionalism and 
their technical know-how acts as a symbolic inscription for the financial officers. 
At TechCo, there are two rationales confronting each other. The technical rationale, 
more legitimate and embedded in the company’s history and culture, puts forward the role 
and autonomy of engineers. They are responsible for the future of the company and carry out 
the whole management: no-one else may interfere in the decision-making process. This group, 
dominant and legitimated by tradition, may be considered as “established” (Elias & Scotson, 
1965). The financial rationale, on the contrary, is more emergent and marginal, and is strongly 
connected to globalisation and financialisation trends (Djelic & Quack, 2003). It relies on 
outsiders (Becker, 1963; Elias & Scotson, 1965), “fringe actors” (Djelic & Quack, 2003): 
financial officers stating that the company now needs a new vision focused on financial 
issues. They believe they could improve the management’s efficiency, but feel constrained 
and sidelined. 
4. THE FORMS OF CONFRONTATION
Engineers and financers confront one another in the name of divergent ideals and 
rationales. To be institutionalised, their ideals must be objectified (Berger & Luckmann, 
1966). At the boundaries, engineers and financers alike have to take over to impose their 10
rationale instead of the other. The technical rationale is dominant, but the balance of powers 
may be challenged by mobilising social skill (Fligstein, 2001) and allies (Latour, 1987). We 
will now show those concrete manifestations in which these two rationales confront each 
other.
4.1 Tactics to redefine the game
Financial officers find themselves in the position of “challenger group”, and must 
mobilise their “social skill” to legitimise their power (Fligstein, 2001). The vice-CFO, who 
may be considered a “skilled strategic actor”, deploys a number of tactics to obtain the co-
operation of operational managers. When he identifies a problem, he starts by looking for all 
the possible solutions before signalling the problem, so as to position himself as an expert in 
the matter. He then organises a meeting, but before it takes place, he meets the key people 
informally to win them over to his side. Finally, during the meetings, he blends technical 
arguments that are easily understood by operational managers with “accounting jargon”, thus 
avoiding contradictory points of view. 
Naturally, these tactics are not always effective. In the negotiation that then ensues, 
seeking allies becomes particularly important (Latour, 1987). Outsiders are precious allies in 
these cases, since they do not recognise the dominant culture of TechCo. Thus, the vice-CFO 
often reminds people that he does not impose changes for the sake of his own pleasure, but 
because he has been asked to do so. In this way he gains entry into the discussion for his 
network: when he wants to justify one alternative in relation to another, his phrases regularly 
start with, “Yesterday, when I was in the office [of the group’s CFO], he told me that he saw 
it more like this…” Consequently, it is no longer he, but a member of the holding, who is 
making the decision. He is no longer the spokesman for the financial management, but 
spokesman for a larger, more coercive and more legitimate network (according to a rational-
legal legitimacy in the sense of Max Weber, 1971).
Members of the holding are important allies. As shareholder representatives, they can 
claim property ties as their source of power (Fligstein, 1987). In addition, the holding is not 
influenced by the same culture as TechCo, the group’s cash cow. On the contrary, the holding 
is listed on the markets and has seen strong external growth. The group’s chairman puts great 
store in modern principles of financial management to be able to provide relevant information 
to financial analysts. The group’s CFO is therefore a powerful ally for TechCo’s financial 
officers. 
Inscriptions, the mobilising of social skill and the search for allies consequently enable 
the financial officers to propose an alternative project to that institutionalised by the 
engineers. The two rationales stem from different sources of power. The technical rationale is 
based upon traditional sources of power, that are highly symbolic; they have been 
institutionalised in the past, and so appear in the corporate structure, which makes them the 
hierarchical source of power. The financial officers thus need emergent sources of power and 
allies in order to impose themselves. It must be noted however, as Fligstein (2001) points out, 
that the search for power cannot be a declared goal. On the contrary, the motivation displayed 
by financial officers is not to increase their power, but to instil sounder management and a 
long-run vision. Consequently, they avoid criticism from operational managers, who would 
never accept financial officers acting in their own interests. 11
Since both groups speak with the same voice about improving the management in the 
company, it is their choice of a “style of accountability” (Ahrens, 1996) that is a point of 
contention. As a result, they translate a struggle for power into a struggle over control. In 
financial officers’ definition of the situation, the behaviour of operational managers is 
consequently perceived as a resistance to control. But it is not a matter of resistance to the 
institution (Oliver, 1991; Prasad & Prasad, 2000; Ezzamel, Willmott & Worthington, 2004; 
Thomas & Davies, 2005), since, on the contrary, the operational managers represent the 
existing institution. Nor is it a matter of resistance to change, because the division directors 
are also looking to improve the company’s results. Financial officers act as carriers of 
financialisation, threatening TechCo’s traditional culture and engineers’ key positions. And 
yet engineers don’t oppose a blind and fruitless resistance. They are not passive either. Both 
groups are conscious of the necessity for the company to be financially competitive. But, as 
they disagree about the means to achieve this objective, they support competing projects 
confronting each other. They lay claim to a shared overarching objective but support 
competing trajectories to achieve it. 
4.2 Conflicting styles and trajectories
Role ambiguity is a major outcome of these conflicting trajectories (Hopper, 1980). But 
it is not a matter of individuals facing tension due to contradictory perceived roles. It is a 
matter of separate populations claiming to expertise in the same issue (Gendron, Cooper & 
Townley, 2007). For instance, controlling purchasing or investment requests is particularly 
sensitive. For purchasing raw materials, financial officers are totally excluded from the 
validation process. Moreover, although management controllers are integrated into the 
process of requesting investment, they resent its under-instrumentation: devices that they got 
to know elsewhere, and that appear relatively standard to them, do not work at TechCo. 
Management controllers receive investment requests from operational managers; but they 
receive these requests at the same time as the directors – or even after them –, without being 
able to validate them ex ante: 
(Paul, management controller of Z. In his office) He shows me how the system for approving 
investment requests works. He opens one of his emails and shows me the whole chain of 
command. Someone makes an investment request; he sends out an email with attachments. There 
is one message and several names with boxes to tick. Some are ticked, others not. I notice, 
amongst others, the name of the Chairman, the CEO, division directors and the CFO. There must 
also be Paul’s name somewhere since he received it. The attachments are Word or Excel 
documents that explain the investment. There isn’t really any format and according to Paul, “some 
put in the minimum”. For example, there is another message from the CEO asking for details, then 
an answer. The CEO insists: given the investment, an IRR must be calculated. Paul explains to me 
that here, they look at the IRR, whereas in his former company they focused more on payback… 
(…)
He shows me some spreadsheets. Some calculations have been done. He complains that this 
message has been sent to everyone at the same time. So the CEO can give his agreement before 
Paul can make any calculations. In his former company, in contrast, it was first sent to him, and 
once he had validated the calculations, it was forwarded to the decision-makers. 
As a result, he shows me a file that comes from his former company. It’s an Excel document 
containing fifteen spreadsheets. The first is a provisional income statement over four years with 
payback marked right at the top. The other pages present spreadsheets justifying the calculations 
and hypotheses. It is very detailed. He explains to me that, for a very large investment, it could 
take him up to six months before validating. 12
Here, on the other hand, when he calls the person who sent the investment request, the person is 
always very surprised. Apparently, his initiative is frowned upon. (…)
Formal meeting. No operational managers are present. 
Bernard (controller of another company in the same division): For the investments, we have to put 
in place budgetary control. Someone makes a request: if he has the budget it goes through, 
otherwise it’s blocked. For the time being, anybody can spent 100,000 dollars without our seeing 
anything! 
Patrice (CFO) contradicts Bernard, but Jean-Michel (accounting director of this same subsidiary) 
agrees with him. 
Bernard: It’s purely for our information! And that goes for the purchasing requests too. 
Jean-Michel: There’s no algorithm or calculation to do, its just document management. 
Management control has follow-up, but it comes a posteriori! 
Eric (management controller from Y) agrees with him. 
Claire (management assistant): I print off a statement every Monday that I send to the budget 
managers… 
Fabrice (vice-CFO): But it is sent out very discretely! So there’s no coercion involved. In the 
interests of keeping things running, people aren’t blocked… 
Description of the purchasing procedure. When a purchase is made, the financial management has 
no right to oversight or approval: it is the director of purchasing who validates. Likewise, when a 
delivery is performed, the invoice and delivery note must be reconciled. If the amounts differ, 
another procedure starts. Within a certain margin (variance of less than five percent), the 
reconciliation is nonetheless performed automatically, as if the amount were correct. But the 
verification procedure may be short-circuited: purchasing can “force through” validation, whatever 
the difference amounts to. Certain members of the financial management and the information 
systems management therefore make the following comment: “there is no longer any limit, 
purchasing can do whatever they want.” The vice-CFO even talks of a “failing in internal control”.
But not everyone is surprised by this system: according to Claire, we must not block operations 
pointlessly. 
Standard financial devices therefore do not impose themselves when faced with the 
influence of technicians. They trigger controversy when financial officers dare to brandish 
them and, most of the time, they encounter rejection. Financial managers cannot define the 
content of their jobs themselves: their goals, their role and therefore their identity in the 
organisation do not depend on them, but are defined by operational managers. 
Competition between financial and technical managers hinges on another type of 
device. Every two months, divisional board meetings bring the two sides together. The unity 
of time and place gives this device a particular character. Here, it is simply a matter of 
spotlighting this rivalry, so often have the more or less accepted roles of each side been 
rehearsed. 
(Eric and Paul, management controllers. In the company canteen). Eric tells us there is a meeting 
at 2 p.m. I ask him some questions, so that he will give me more details. 
Eric: Every two months, there is a board meeting for each division, with the top executives of the 
division, the financial director, the CEO, the sales director, etc. But twice a year, and it happens to 
be today, the Chairman is also there. And today, the meeting’s in English because the CEO [of an 
American company that has just been bought out] is present. (…)
The heads of division must present the situation: ten minutes spent on the accounts; between two 
and three hours spent on the rest (notably, big projects in progress). 
Paul: At [my former company], it was quite the opposite. 
The observer: It must be rather interesting for you to be present at this type of meeting; it allows 
you to have a global view of the business. And what’s more, that means you are integrated into the 
boards, with the Chairman and all… 
Eric: Yes, well… sometimes I wonder if it wouldn’t be better if we weren’t at those meetings! 
(Surprised look from the observer). Well, I mean… in fact, we act to divert attention. When the 
board gets to the difficult points, they [the division directors] prefer to pick up on an accounting 
problem. Then everyone turns to us! So we explain to them where it comes from, what it means, 13
etc. And that can take half an hour… In short, they throw everything back at us! And when that’s 
over, we move on to something else. In that way, they don’t have to explain themselves on a point 
that raises problems. 
As devices that set the stage, board meetings bring together technicians and financial 
officers in a single place only to confirm the supremacy of the former over the latter, at least 
in the eyes of the latter. 
This regular confrontation, transformed into a routine, reminds management controllers 
on a daily basis that they are not legitimate. In return, they refute a situation that does not 
appear to them to be adequate: instead of taking part in decision-making, they have the feeling 
of justifying decisions. As a result, their role does not seem to be to draw the attention of 
managers to particular points, but rather to divert the attention of the senior management and 
prevent it from seeing certain problems arise. The consequence of this situation is doubt cast 
on the correct translation of how the company runs into the accounts. There is therefore a loss 
of confidence in the relevance of accounting data: management devices cannot therefore be 
legitimately conferred on representatives of the financial management. 
Supporting a specific rationale, financial officers at TechCo try to enter decision-
making processes. Using social skills and enrolling allies, they begin to gain entry to their 
network (Callon, 1986; Latour, 1987). They advocate following a competing trajectory to 
achieve the shared objective of improving the management in the company. This project is 
based on a more financial style of accountability (Ahrens, 1996). Within this style, 
operational managers would be accountable for profitability and margins, and financial 
officers’ role would be to help them to understand accounting and its links to operations. 
5. FROM STRUGGLE TO NEGOTIATION AND CO-OPERATION
However, the discourse of managers is very different. According to them, in stark 
contrast, the financial management conducts its projects and rolls out its own tools without 
taking the problems facing these managers into account. The financial officers serve their own 
interests, or those of the senior management, but not those of ongoing operations. This 
criticism comes out, for instance, in the following discussion: 
(Company canteen. Present are the vice-CFO, the director of accounting, the chief accountant, the 
management control manager, two management controllers, the director of division Z and the 
director of design for this same division) 
Julien (director of division Z), in a provocative tone: So, where are we with the project [for 
adopting the production software as an accounting software]? 
The vice-CFO tells him where the situation stands. 
Julien (almost annoyed): What I see is that it is going to force me to change. But what I don’t 
understand is, what it is going to bring me? I’m not saying that my system is optimal, but at least it 
exists… 
Fabrice, calmly, puts forward several arguments. Julien answers him.
Fabrice (less calmly): But it is not I who wants to change everything! Let me remind you that I 
was asked to do it at branch level… 
Fairly quickly, Julien losses a little of his confidence, and appears rather forlorn (he looks at his 
plate, speaks less loudly, and has stopped smiling at Fabrice’s arguments). 
Julien: What I suggest is that you come to see what I do and see how you can sort out your bonds 
afterwards. 
Fabrice: But that’s what I intended to do. 
Julien: You see, what I resent is that reporting is done for the CEO and not to help operational 
managers steer their activity. 14
Véronique (management control manager): But reportings can be useful to different people… 
Operational managers therefore resent management tools being used to evaluate their 
work, but not being used enough to help them out. One important point is that the discourses 
are contradictory: according to management controllers, operational managers do not let them 
participate in ongoing operations; according to the operational managers, management 
controllers work mostly for the senior management and not enough for them. This 
contradiction is related to role conflicts of management accountants (Hopper, 1980): 
operational managers and financial officers disagree about what it means to “help operational 
managers steer their activity”. Management controllers would like to actively participate in 
decision-making, whereas operational managers want them to provide hard numbers in 
reporting. When Julien states that “reporting is done for the CEO”, he actually means that it is 
mainly about accounting numbers. 
While French management accountants seem close to German ones (Ahrens, 1997; 
Ahrens & Chapman, 2000), they identify with British accountants. These conflicting “virtual 
social identities” (Goffman, 1963) might be subsumed within a specific and situational 
identity. To achieve this convergence, financial officers need to move from conflicts and 
struggles to co-operation with their audiences. 
Management accounting devices are indeed used by financial officers as both weapons 
and tools of negotiation and pacification. They become offensive, with a relative degree of 
effectiveness, whenever financial officers seek to import traditional financial methods into 
TechCo. On the other hand, management accounting devices cause appeasement whenever, in 
fine, they are accepted by both sides. Ideals enclosed in these non-humans become hard facts 
(Latour, 1987). Management accounting devices uncover controversies but, whether after 
explicit or non-explicit negotiation, they sometimes point the way towards a peace that, 
although precarious, makes “living with each other” possible.
The monthly routine of reporting uncover a harsh controversy (see above). However, it 
hinges on a book (often only called “the P&L”) constructed by financial officers but defended 
by engineers. When operational managers have to report to senior management, they thus 
need financial officers to translate accounting numbers into technical issues. The two 
populations cooperate and reporting contributes to pacifying relations. 
Another management device, implemented during the observation period, will enable 
the financial officers to limit “power asymmetry” of the relationship (Bigus, 1972): it is the 
implementation of an ERP system (Chapman, 2005; Dechow & Mouritsen, 2005; Quattrone 
& Hopper, 2005). Indeed, by connecting their tools to those of operational managers, the 
financial officers manage to renew their dialogue with the latter: they begin to “cultivate” the 
relationship (Bigus, 1972). However, concessions are also necessary: rather than using the 
group’s ERP system, TechCo has bought the accounting module of the production software 
already in place. But the situation is very different: from the moment that devices are 
connected, any modification of the software has an impact on the work of the financial 
management, and operational managers can no longer change their devices without informing 
the financial officers. Discussion, interaction and co-operation enter everyday practices. Eric, 
a management controller, perceives the interest of the new device, as much in his work as in 
the relationships that he maintains with operational managers: 
(Informal discussion, two months before the launch of the new software)15
Eric: The problem is that we cannot always link up with accounts. The result is the same… In fact, 
all the cost and sales accounts are right, but it is the management accounting that poses a problem. 
And the unexplained variance can be a million euros! 
Hence the interest [in the new software]. In [this software], variance is targeted, which means that, 
because it is a production software, there are already variance accounts into which all the data that 
we need are entered. This could allow us to have the [reporting] book by pushing on a single 
button. 
Paul: Yes, because for the time being, closure entails three and a half days of calculations and a 
day and a half of analysis. 
Eric: But it’s going to be better, since it’s going to be an ERP… 
The observer: But in fact this software seems a lot more oriented towards operations, when an 
ERP like SAP seems to be more oriented towards finance…
Eric: Ah, that’s for sure. But [this software] was bought by the divisions ten years ago, so now we 
have to adapt. It would be too complicated to get the divisions to change… 
(One evening, in the company canteen. All members of the financial management and the 
information systems management are invited to celebrate the successful launch of the new 
software) 
Eric: It works rather well. There are a few difficulties right now, but in the long-run it’s really very 
good. It’s integrated… Things will be faster: there are things we do now that we won’t have to do 
anymore. And it gives us a better position with regard to operational managers. Before, when they 
used to ask where a figure for an overspend came from, it was difficult to explain. Now we can 
more easily go back and it’s in [the same software], so we can trace back to things that they input 
themselves. Afterwards, the problem comes either from a wrong entry, or from a real problem. 
In this new system, the controllers can go back to the source of the data, meaning an 
action performed by an operational officer. It is then no longer possible to blame the 
accounting translation. Therefore, it is by getting as close as possible to operations that the 
financial management succeeds in introducing its tools. Financial officers then produce 
devices that directly interest operational managers, whilst remaining the only ones able to 
decipher them and translate them into the language of operational managers. The financial 
management then becomes an obligatory passage point for operational managers (Callon, 
1986; Latour, 1987). 
Consequently, management accounting devices appear as the central point in the tension 
between the two rationales, their ideals, their discourses and their inscriptions. Even though 
they do not exhaust the struggles and controversies, they open the debate between 
contradictory points of view. Their implementation, their development and their daily 
management are therefore one way of crystallising relationships, and illustrate the progressive 
construction of a negotiated order (Strauss, 1992), of shifting compromise between two 
rationales (Simmel, 1955). 
6. CONCLUSION
At TechCo, two groups support competing styles of accountability (Ahrens, 1996) and 
relate their projects to divergent rationales: their visions are contradictory. Even if they seek 
to achieve the same objective, they may disagree about what that should imply in terms of 
practices. This situation creates role conflicts (Hopper, 1980), or even identity conflicts. As 
TechCo’s story tells us, the struggle between professional groups may last before the victory 
of one of them. A rather long period of coexistence between several rationales thus may exist. 
But divergent trends and interests may lead to occasional and situational convergence and 
agreement (Elias, 1939; Simmel, 1955). Positioning ourselves at the very moment when the 16
result is not clear, we then see how intraorganizational struggle involves negotiation and even 
co-operation between competing groups. Our point is not to say that an organisational order 
based on co-operation always appears. But competing groups, even when they disagree about 
what is appropriate organisational behaviour or good practices of accountability, sometimes 
interact and co-operate. Their goal is not always to achieve domination against the other, but 
to find a way to live with each other. 
At TechCo, one emergent rationale begins to modify the traditional style of 
accountability, but does not replace the established rationale. More than the domination of a 
rationale over the others, it seems to be this confrontation between rationales that explains the 
construction of organisational roles and occupational identities. However, by working with 
each other, financial officers as well as operational managers alter their respective definition 
of the situation. Interaction and co-operation thus modify their rationales. “The proposition 
that values influence behavior is insufficient; it is equally true that situations influence 
values” (Becker, Geer, Hughes & Strauss, 1961, p.430; see also Quattrone & Hopper, 1999). 
These situational roles and identities are related to a negotiated order (Strauss, 1992), or 
“hovering organisational order” (Ahrens, 1997), translated into a situational and negotiated 
control. This is not a “control over” (Boland, 1979), because there is no hierarchical link 
between operational managers and financial officers. Nor is it a “control with” (Boland, 
1979), based on shared values and beliefs, since, on the contrary, the two groups follow 
divergent ideals and rationales. It is best described as an assemblage of heterogeneous 
informal arrangements continuously renegotiated to face specific concerns. Studying the 
coexistence of competing rationales and the translation of intergroup relations from conflict to 
relative co-operation thus might help us to open up new ways of understanding the 
construction of accounting and management control. 17
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